consider the ancient Kanuri population living west of Lake Chad in the present Niger Republic to have been the core group of the Bornu state. By disentangling the medieval history of Kanem-Bornu from that of the Sao, the common heritage of the Kanuri and the Sao-Kotoko, reaching back to classical times, will come into better focus.

To Article IX (1993a: “Ethnogenesis”)

This study focuses on the role of the Duguwa or Zaghawa and the Sefuwa in the history of Kanem-Bornu. Realizing that these two ruling groups can neither be defined as different dynasties nor as different people, it suggests that they were two clans closely associated in the exercise of power. Most important for the assessment of the role of the Duguwa in the Chadic state is the reappearance of the Zaghawa/Zaghay name in an external source from the first half of the fifteenth century (1979b: 207 § 32). In terms of internal developments, this strange occurrence of a quasi-ethnic label corresponds to the rise to power of the Bulala in Kanem and the temporary leading role assumed by Duguwa officials in Bornu (1993b: 272; 1993b: 52n). While in Kanem an exclusive Duguwa rule had been established by the Bulala, the situation in Bornu was characterized by conflicts within the Sefuwa dynasty and a royal court dominated by conciliatory non-royal Duguwa officials.26 Furthermore, the existence of numerous non-royal Duguwa in Kanem and further east seems to have given rise to the present ethnic connotation of the term Zaghawa (1977a: 153 n. 50). The distinction between royal and non-royal Duguwa can be based on the example of the Ife court where the Modewa – divided into three factions – are in a middle position between the non-royal clans of the Odudua section of the population and the Odudua-inclined king. In the Chadic state, the royal Karde slaves, who were in the nineteenth century under the command of the Digma, might have corresponded to the Modewa, while the Duguwa clans not associated with power can be compared to the Odudua section of the society.27

Going one step further, we may now accept that the first Muslim ruler of Kanem was a woman, as suggested by the Girgam (1977a: 67-68; 1993a: 265). Indeed, Hawwā bi’ti Arkū (1061-1065), belonging to the Duguwa royal estab-

26 According to a more radical interpretation, taking the reference of al-Maqrit to the Zaghay (Lange, 1979b: 207 § 32) as applying to the second half of the thirteenth century, and considering Kade (1242-1270) and ‘Abd Allāh (1310-1328) to be Duguwa, it could even be argued that the mu‘tā incident resulted in the return of the Duguwa to power.

27 Nachtrigal, Sahara, 1, 647, 718. See also Smith, Daura, 28, 82-83. For the Modewa see Lange 2004a: 137-138, 145.

Addenda et Corrigenda
lishment, might have been vested with an important women's office such as the Magira in Bornu, and she might have been nominally Muslim. In this respect we should note that the authors of the Girgam depict the mother of the second successor of Humé, no doubt on account of her position as Magira, as a powerful woman who, in accordance to Islamic law, emprisoned her own son for having too severely punished a thief (1977a: § 14). The nominal adherence of the second most important official of the Duguwa royal establishment to Islam could have been decisive for her temporary leading role in the state. A few years later the elimination of the royal Duguwa from power would in turn appear to have been the consequence of a general incompatibility between Islam and the continued reliance of the Duguwa on the basic practices and ceremonies of divine kingship. As former worshippers of netherworld deities and as staunch defenders of divine kingship, they, like the Azna of Hausaland, were less favourably disposed towards Islam than the worshippers of upperworld deities (see above pp. 246-248).

The single most important event giving rise to the emergence of the radical Duguwa faction of the Bulala in Kanem, was the destruction of the munë by Dünama Dibalemi (c. 1203-1242). This event should not solely be conceived as a mortal blow against divine kingship, but also as an attempt to deprive the Duguwa of their remaining influence at the royal court. As long as the munë cult was practiced, even as a traditional ceremony, the Duguwa were assured of their continued participation in the state cult and of their association with royal administration. Its destruction heralded for them not only the end of their former world view, but also the decisive undermining of their social identity. Although the Duguwa rebellion prevented a restructuring of the palace organization, as we can see from the survival of the Duguwa in the Bornu court, it was the munë incident – and not the formal adoption of Islam by the court or the rise of the Sefuwa – which precipitated the most formidable crisis for the Chadic state. It not only led to the loss of Kanem but also to the temporary resurgence of the Duguwa in Bornu.

A last point to be clarified concerns the origin of the munë cult. Following the Sudanic state theory, the article supposes an Egyptian influence via Meroë and consequently adopts the name Amun. In fact, few culture traits in West African kingdoms point to Egyptian antecedents (1993b: 70-73; 2003: 3-6). The existence of similar highly venerated cult objects have been noted for Kano and Songhay (2004d). The people of Kano used to sacrifice a great number of cattle to the dirki associated with the Koran. The neglect of the cult is supposed to have caused famine, and have brought about the nineteenth century. Songhay included an incident in the text to the next. In line with the Jewish influence on early Christians, we should consider the three-stone altar term din tür might derive from the Hebrew 'ôhâ “altar” of the Ugaritic and Hebrew biblical manna inscribed as the covenant and a jar of oil, as such there have been attempts to link the principles of divine kingship to a guarantee for justice.

Section Three: Hausa States

For years I was troubled by the problem of how the Hausa states. There were frequent attempts to long-lasting influence from the powerful Hausa community, which in present-day Northern Nigeria was a question (1987b: 1989b) to establish a state. The Bayajidda later emerged as one of the state of politics in the area. Their own cultural tradition based on the eastern neighbour (XII).

My appointment to begin a participation in the DFG project was finally possible to have taken place in the

28 De Moraes Farias points out the high position of the “queen” (malika) in the contemporary Gao state (Inscriptions, §§ 415-421).
29 Oliver/Fage, Short History, 31-38.
30 Kano Chronicle, § 4.
32 HAL. I, 211; IV, 1576.
33 Aistläruber, Wörterbuch
34 Ex 16: 34; Deur 8: 2
to have caused famine, and the destruction of the sacred object is considered to have brought about the conquest by the Fulani Jihadists at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Until the end of the Askia dynasty, the royal emblems of Songhay included an object called din tür which was transmitted from one ruler to the next. In line with other elements suggesting important Hebrew-Phoenician influences on early state building processes in the Sahelian belt, it is tempting to consider the three sacred objects in connection with the Israelite tradition. The term din tür might derive from the North West Semitic din “law, tribunal” and the Hebrew tōrā “instruction, Pentateuch.” The term dirki is perhaps related to the Ugaritic and Hebrew derk “power, throne of power.” Munē could refer to the biblical manna insofar as part of this miraculous food was kept in the ark of the covenant and a jar of it was placed in the Sanctuary. Each of the three terms may therefore have been a popular name for the holiest object of a state based on the principles of divine kingships. It was considered as a safeguard for abundance and a guarantee for justice and legal government.

Section Three: Hausa States

For years I was troubled by the question of Kanem-Bornu hegemony over the Hausa states. There were only oral traditions and no texts to support arguments for long-lasting influences of the Chadic state on kingdoms further west. Also the powerful Hausa communities of today and the minority position of the Kanuri in present-day Northern Nigeria, inhibited any straightforward answer to the question (1987b; 1987c; 1988c). In the end it was my ongoing preoccupation with the Bayajidda legend which slowly nurtured my conviction that, in spite of an age-old political dependency on Kanem-Bornu, the Hausa states upheld their own cultural traditions unaffected by any direct inputs from their powerful eastern neighbours (XI; XII).

My appointment at the University of Bayreuth in 1987 and my ensuing participation in the DFG-sponsored African research group gave me the opportunity to begin field research on Kebbi history. At first I attempted to interpret the oral data, especially the Kanta legend of origin, in the context of medieval state and trade history (VIII, 1991b). When I realized that regional changes supposed to have taken place in the late medieval period could not account for the main fea-

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31 Ibn al-Mukhtar, T. al-Fantah, 153/16, 274.
32 HAL, I, 211; IV, 1575-1578.
33 Aistlmturm, Wörterbuch, 79-80, 82-83; HAL, I, 223.
34 Ex 16: 34; Deut 8: 3; Heb 9: 4; HAL, II, 564.